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While conducting empirical work, researchers sometimes observe changes in outcomes before adoption
of a new treatment program. The conventional diagnosis is that treatment is endogenous. Observing
changes in outcomes prior to treatment is also consistent, however, with anticipation effects. This paper
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While conducting empirical work, researchers sometimes observe changes in outcomes before adoption of a new treatment program or policy. Figure 1 provides an
example from the medical malpractice liability context. It shows that equilibrium
physician labor supply increased well before states adopted caps on punitive damages to lower physician liability.1 The conventional diagnosis researchers make upon
observing such a pattern in the data is that the treatment was endogenous: it was
adopted in response to changes in pre-period outcomes.2
Figure 1: Excess physician supply before and after punitive damage caps: annual leads
and lags from 5 years before to 5 years after adoption
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Note: This figure plots the normalized coefficients λj from the following regression: ln yist = Σ5j=−5 λj Dst+j +γXist +
uist , where yist is physician count for specialty i in state s in year t, Dst+j is an indicator for whether punitive damage
caps was first adopted in period t + j, and Xist includes state-specialty and specialty-year fixed effects.

Observing changes in outcomes prior to treatment is also consistent, however, with
anticipation effects. Perhaps individuals began changing their behavior in response to
an expectation that they would be treated in the future. Anticipation is a reasonable
diagnosis if individuals are forward looking, have access to information on future
1

It might be surprising that physician supply responds at all to punitive damages since such
damages constitute only 1-4% of total malpractice awards (Cohen 2004). We show in Section 4.3.1,
however, that this statistic underestimates the impact of punitive damages on physician behavior.
2
One might object that the graph shows a pre-period trend in treatment states. (The regression
generating the pre-post graph controls for time fixed effects.) This trend raises the question of why
there is such a trend only in treatment states. The answer suggests that identifying such trends is
just another way of suggesting that the treatment is endogenous.

2

treatment, and there is a benefit to acting before treatment is adopted.
It is unlikely, for example, that the treatment in Figure 1 was endogenous. Punitive damage caps were targeted at all lawsuits, not just medical malpractice suits,
and were adopted in states with a wide range of physician supply levels. Moreover,
it is quite plausible that physicians simply anticipated the reform. Newspapers and
medical malpractice insurance companies signaled there would be reform years prior
to actual adoption with news stories and changes in premiums, respectively. Finally,
physicians have a large financial incentive to change behavior prior to adoption: medical errors made prior to tort reforms are subject to lower penalties under the new
regime.
To be clear, we do not argue that researchers should interpret pre-period trends
as evidence of anticipation effects. That interpretation must depend on the particular
model and application in question. Instead our claim is that determining whether
treatment is endogenous or merely anticipated has important consequences for inference and thus needs to be seriously considered. Whereas endogeneity may cause the
researchers to over- or underestimate a treatment effect, anticipation effects usually
cause researchers to underestimate them. The reason is that the typical before-after
comparison attributes anticipatory treatment effects to the control group. As a result, it not only ignores, but deducts, anticipatory treatment effects from the overall
treatment effect.3
This paper makes three contributions. First, it provides a framework for rigorously comparing the different models that may be employed to estimate anticipation
effects. In particular, the framework reveals the assumptions embedded in different
empirical models of anticipation effects, describes how those models change as those
assumptions are modified, and discusses the relative merits of different assumptions
and models. Second, it examines how to address the problem that agents’ expectations are unobservable and proposes a new set of instrumental variables that can be
employed to overcome it. Finally, as a demonstration, we estimate the effect of tort
reform on physician supply and show that accounting for anticipation effects doubles
our estimates.
3

This is not always the case. For example, property owners who anticipated the Endangered
Species Act deforested land with endangered species before the law went into effect so that the Act
would not restrict development on their land (Lueck and Michael 2003). Anticipation of the statute
thus increased habitat destruction before adoption and reduced it after adoption.
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Our framework begins with a forward-looking regression of the form
y t = λ0 dt + Σ ∞
j=1 λj Et [dt+j ] + et

(1)

where yt is some outcome, {dt+j } are a sequence of future treatment states, and Et
indicates expectation taken with respect to an agent’s information set at time t.4
This forward-looking regression model has a wide array of applications, including
investments in human capital (e.g., Ryoo and Rosen 2004), rational addiction (e.g.,
Becker, Grossman, and Murphy 1994), present value models (e.g., Chow 1989), R&D
investment decisions (e.g., Acemoglu and Linn 2004), pricing of durable goods (e.g.,
Kahn 1986) and real estate (e.g., Poterba 1984). Two main difficulties arise when
estimating this model. First, there are potentially an infinite number of anticipation
terms. Second, those anticipation terms are generally unobserved.
Consider the problem of infinite anticipation terms. A common response in the
empirical microeconomics literature is to estimate a “quasi-myopic” model that omits
anticipation terms more than S periods prior to treatment.5 Indeed, this is the sort of
model employed to generate pre-post graphs such as Figure 1 that are ubiquitous in
this literature.6 If agents respond earlier than S periods prior to treatment, however,
this model will suffer from omitted variable bias.
An alternative approach common in the finance and macroeconomics literature
is to posit outcomes as a function of exponentially discounted expectations about
future treatment (e.g., Chow 1989). In this formulation treatment has a constant,
contemporaneous treatment effect of β and an anticipation effect j periods prior to
treatment of βθj . This model resembles a present-value asset pricing model. Exponential discounting has the useful feature that suitable differencing can eliminate
nearly all anticipation terms. Depending on assumptions made about what agents
forecast, the resulting Euler equation may be what macroeconomists call the forward4

In general, we will use i to index agents. However, except in Section 3.1, we suppress the index i
in the forward-looking model (1) to simplify the exposition. We assume throughout that the agent’s
information set is Ωt = {y0 , ..., yt−1 , x0 , ..., xt , d0 , ..., dt }, where the x are possible covariates.
5
Although there are a large number of examples, the following are typical: Acemoglu and Linn
(2004), Ayers, Cloyd, and Robinson (2005), Bhattacharya and Vogt (2003), de Figueiredo and
Vanden Bergh (2004), Finkelstein (2004), Gruber and Koszegi (2001), Heckman and Robb (1985),
Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan (1993), Lemos (2006), Lueck and Michael (2003), and Mertens and
Ravn (2011).
6
See, e.g., Autor, Donohue, and Schwab (2006) and Finkelstein (2004).
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looking rational expectations model. This equation takes the familiar form
yt = θEt [yt+1 ] + βdt + εt

(2)

Our framework advances the literature by highlighting the assumptions required
to generate the precise regression models estimated in prior literature as well as
alternative regression models that emerge if assumptions are changed. It also provides
a common benchmark for both the quasi-myopic and exponential discounting models
that for the first time allows a comparison of the merits of each.
The second problem with estimating a model of anticipation effects is that expectations are generally not observed. A common response is to examine shocks that
alter expectations about treatment but do not actually administer a treatment. An
example is a regulation that is enacted at time t but not implemented until time
t + k (e.g., Alpert 2010, Gruber and Koszegi 2001, Lueck and Michael 2003, Blundell,
Francesconi, and Van der Klaauw 2010).7 Unless actual expectations are observed,
however, the investigator can only estimate a reduced form model which demonstrates that expectations affect outcomes, but does not identify the precise slope of
the relationship.8
An alternative approach is to assume a model of belief formation, such as rational
or adaptive expectations, in order to substitute observable variables for unobservable
expectations of a variable. Unless the forecast error is orthogonal to the observable
variables, however, the researcher will have to instrument for them. The usual source
for these instruments is a subset of the agent’s information set, for instance, lags
of the observable variable (see McCallum 1976). These lags influence the agent’s
unobservable forecast of a variable but do not directly influence the outcome variable.
For instance, in equation (2), lags of yt may be suitable instruments for Et [yt+1 ].
We propose an alternative set of instruments: leads of the observable variable.9
From equation (1), we know both Et [yt+1 ] and leads of yt+1 depend on future treatment, and are thus correlated. Moreover, from the Euler condition (2), we know the
7

For studies that examine shocks to information and no eventual treatment (t = ∞), see Stango
(2003) and Karpoff, Lott, and Wehrly (2005).
8
We elaborate on this point in Section 2.2.
9
Our idea is inspired by the autoregressive error-components model studied in the dynamic panel
literature (e.g., Arellano and Bond 1991, Arellano and Bover 1995, Blundell and Bond 1998). That
model resembles the forward-looking rational expectations model, except that the latter looks forward in time.
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outcome variable yt , when conditioned on Et [yt+1 ], does not depend on outcomes beyond time t + 1. Thus, in equation (2), leads of yt+1 may also be suitable instruments
for Et [yt+1 ]. Our paper outlines the precise conditions necessary for these instruments
to be valid.
In general, leads can complement lags as instruments for expectations in the
forward-looking regression. There are situations, however, in which only lags or only
leads are valid. For example, if agents do not update their forecasts each period, we
shall show that lags are no longer valid. Conversely, if the Euler equation implied by
the exponential discounting model includes lags of the dependent variable, we shall
show that leads are invalid instruments.
Finally, we compare the different methods of estimating anticipation effects by
examining the effect of tort liability on physician supply. Our main identifying assumption is that the tort reforms we examine are conditionally exogenous to physician
supply for the subset of states we examine. Prior literature in this area has estimated
the treatment effect of tort liability ignoring anticipation effects (e.g., Kessler, Sage,
and Becker 2005, Klick and Stratmann 2007, Matsa 2007). Our results suggest that
accounting for anticipation effects increases the estimated impact of tort liability by a
factor of two. We show in the main text that caps on punitive damages have a positive
temporary treatment effect on physician supply of 1.5 to 2.2 percent and a positive
permanent effect of 5.0 to 6.4 percent after accounting for anticipation effects. In the
Appendix we show that curbs on joint and several liability (an increase in physician
liability) and split recovery rules (a reduction in liability) have a temporary effect on
physician supply of -1.3 to -1.5 percent and 1.3 to 1.5 percent and a permanent effect
of -4.0 to -6.7 percent and 4.1 to 6.1 percent, respectively.
The following is an outline of the remainder of the paper. Section 1 reviews the
parameters of interest in a forward-looking regression. Section 2 elaborates on the
various parametric restrictions that may be employed to reduce the number of expectation terms in the forward-looking regression. Section 3 discusses how to estimate
the Euler equation (2) for a given model of belief formation. It examines the instruments that can be employed to address endogeneity from forecast errors, including
leads of endogenous variables. Section 4 applies the different approaches to estimating
the forward-looking model using data on tort liability and physician supply. Finally,
Section 5 concludes with suggestions for future research.10
10

The Appendix takes up topics that complement the discussion in the main text. Whereas the
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1

Parameters of interest

Before estimating a model of anticipation effects such as
y t = λ0 dt + Σ ∞
j=1 λj Et [dt+j ] + et
it is useful to define the possible parameters of interest from a policy evaluation
framework.11 The first parameter of interest is λ0 , which is the effect of one period
of treatment at time t on time-t outcomes. This measure ignores anticipation effects
prior to treatment. Thus, the baseline for this change is not the outcome at time t − 1
but rather outcomes in the infinite past or, more practically, before agents anticipated
the adoption of treatment. Following Becker, Grossman, and Murphy (1994) we shall
call this the temporary treatment effect.
The second parameter of interest is Σ∞
j=0 λj . One can interpret this as the effect
on time-t outcomes of a permanent treatment adopted at time t.12 This includes the
effect on current outcomes of the current period of treatment plus the anticipation
effects on current outcomes of the future periods of treatment. The baseline again
is outcomes before any anticipation effects. Hamilton (1994) (p. 7) calls the second
parameter of interest the “long-run effect on y of a permanent change in d.” Following Becker, Grossman, and Murphy (1994), however, we shall refer to the second
parameter as simply the permanent treatment effect.
The two parameters of interest are illustrated in Figure 2. The dotted line illustrates how the levels of an outcome y change in response to adoption of a temporary,
one-period treatment at time t that was perfectly anticipated. The level of y at date
main text focuses on models with rational expectations, the Appendix takes up models with adaptive
expectations. The Appendix also considers problems that arise when treatment variables are binary.
Finally, whereas Section 4 presents results for the one reform depicted in Figure 1 (punitive damage
caps), the Appendix takes up two other reforms where anticipation effects are likely (joint and several
liability reform and split recovery rules).
11
It is easy to add ex post adjustment costs to the forward-looking model. Because we are interesting in ex ante changes in behavior, we will without loss of generality ignore all time-varying ex
post treatment effects.
12
An alternative interpretation of the second parameter is the effect of one period of treatment at
time t on outcomes in time t plus the sum of the effect on outcomes in all prior periods assuming
agents have always known treatment would start at time t. This includes both the effect on current
outcomes of current treatment and all the anticipation effects on all past outcomes of the current
period of treatment. Hamilton (1994) (p. 7) calls this the “cumulative effect on y of a transitory
change in d.” This interpretation corresponds to the area under the dotted line over the interval
(−∞, t] in Figure 2.
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Figure 2: Potential parameters of interest
Permanent treatment

Height =
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treatment effect)
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treatment

Height =
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t − j is equal to the coefficient λj in our forward-looking model. The level of y on date
t, when the one-period treatment is actually given, is equal to the first parameter, λ0 .
The solid line illustrates how y would respond if instead a permanent treatment were
adopted at time t and that treatment was perfectly anticipated. The anticipation
effects are larger with permanent treatment because each pre-period outcome reflects
not just the anticipation of treatment in period t, but also anticipation of treatment
in period t + 1, t + 2, etc. Specifically, the level of y at time t − k is equal to Σ∞
j=k λj .
An implication is that the level of y in every post-period corresponds to the second
interpretation of second parameter of interest.13

2

Simplifying the forward-looking model

The primary challenges with estimating a forward-looking model are the infinite number of expectation terms and their unobservability. Here we discuss three different
ways to solve these problems.
First, a researcher might completely ignore anticipation effects. Unfortunately,
this approach suffers from the omitted variable bias we describe in Section 2.1. Second, a researcher might estimate a quasi-myopic model that includes only a finite
number S anticipation terms. If individuals anticipate a treatment more than S
13

The figure also suggests that permanent treatment adopted at time t not only raises outcomes
in each post-period by what we call the permanent effect of treatment, but it also has an effect of
∞
Σ∞
k=1 Σj=k λj across all pre-periods.
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periods ahead, however, the model will also suffer from omitted variable bias. Moreover, the model contains S unobserved expectation terms. We explore these issues in
Section 2.2.
Third, a researcher could adopt an exponential discounting model that assumes
outcomes are a function of exponentially discounted expectations about treatment.
Exponential discounting has the useful feature that suitable differencing can eliminate
nearly all anticipation terms. The resulting Euler equation allows the researcher to
identify anticipation effects at the cost of only a single degree of freedom. We elaborate
on this in Section 2.3.

2.1

Myopic model

The simplest approach to dealing with anticipation effects is to ignore them and
estimate a myopic model such as
yt = β0 dt + ut
The omission of anticipation effects generates omitted variable bias. The specific
nature of the bias depends on which parameter of interest from the previous section
the researcher seeks to estimate.14
If anticipation effects have the same sign as temporary effects, the estimated
coefficient β̂0myopic is probably larger (in absolute value) than the temporary effect of
treatment (λ0 ) in the forward-looking model. The reason is that current treatment
and expected future treatment are surely positively correlated: Corr(dit , Et [dit+j ]) >
0.15 In this case,
plim |β̂0myopic | = |β0 | + Σ∞
j=1 |βj | αj > |λ0 |
where αj is the coefficient from a regression of Et [dt+j ] on dt . Intuitively, the coefficient on current treatment in the myopic model captures some of the effect of future
14

Heckman, Lochner, and Taber (1998) considers the effects of changes in tuition on schooling
and earnings and shows that standard treatment effect models yield misleading estimates if they fail
to take agents’ expectations into account.
15
Negative correlation between current treatment and expected future treatment implies that
subjects frequently alternate between treated and untreated states. It is difficult to come up with
examples of such treatments. Zero correlation is possible, but rules out infrequent treatment or
treatment that lasts multiple periods.
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Figure 3: Estimate from a myopic model
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treatment.16
Conversely, the myopic coefficient estimate is typically smaller (in absolute value)
than the permanent effect of treatment in the forward-looking model since αj ≤ 1, so
∞
that Σ∞
j=0 |βj | αj < Σj=0 |λj |. Intuitively, the coefficient in the myopic model captures
the effect of permanent treatment if the current state of treatment perfectly predicts
all future expected states of treatment. This is obviously not the case in periods
before an agent is treated. Thus the estimate from the myopic model underestimates
the permanent effect of treatment.
This point is illustrated in Figure 3, which plots the outcome of a forward-looking
process after adoption of a permanent treatment at time t. Assume that the true
permanent effect of the intervention is to increase outcomes by Σ∞
j=0 λj = ypost − ypre .
Estimation of a myopic model, however, yields a treatment effect β̂0myopic that is
sample
the difference between the average outcome ypre
before the law is passed and the
This result is not fully general. If the myopic model is estimated with fixed effects, β̂0myopic

may dip below |λ0 |. Fixed effects estimation is equivalent to yit − ȳi = β0 dit − d¯i + (uit − ūi ).
Thus


Cov Et [dit+j ] − d¯i , dit − d¯i


plim β̂0myopic = |λ0 | + Σ∞
|λ
|
j
j=1
V ar dit − d¯i


This may be lower than |λ0 | since, e.g., −Cov dit , d¯i < 0. The larger is the timespan T of the data,


the greater is the probability that β̂ myopic > |λ0 | since Cov dit , d¯i falls with larger T .
16

0
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average outcome ypost after the law is passed. The myopic estimate is less than
the true permanent effect because the researcher observes a finite number of pretreatment periods, say [t − k, t], but expectations may have begun shifting outcomes
sample
in the sample
well before t − k. Therefore the average pre-treatment outcome ypre
is greater than the true pre-treatment outcome ypre . Another way to put this is that
the researcher has assigned some periods that belong in the treatment group (because
expectations are operating) to the control group, and thus overestimated outcomes
in the control group.

2.2

Quasi-myopic model

To address the shortcomings of the myopic model, a researcher might estimate a
quasi-myopic model that assumes agents have anticipation effects, but only for a
finite number of periods S:
yt = β0 dt + ΣSj=1 βj Et [dt+j ] + ut

(3)

This addresses the dimensionality problem in the general forward-looking model by
ignoring anticipation terms after S periods, perhaps on the theory that agents do
not forecast past S periods or that anticipation effects past S years have negligible
effects.
One weakness of this model is that the researcher must know the number of
periods in which there are anticipation effects.17 If the researcher underestimates this
number, her coefficient estimates will suffer omitted variable bias just as the myopic
coefficient estimate does. Assuming positive correlation in treatment over time, one
would expect the quasi-myopic estimate β̂0quasi to overestimate the temporary effect
of treatment (λ0 ) and the estimate ΣSj=0 β̂jquasi to underestimate the permanent effect
of treatment (Σ∞
j=0 λj ).
In practice, the quasi-myopic model has a second shortcoming: the S periods of
expectations are unobserved. Researchers frequently address this problem by sub17

Even if one employs a regulation enacted at time t but not implemented until time t + k as a
shock to expectations (e.g., Gersen and Posner 2007, Huber 2011, Alpert 2010, Gruber and Koszegi
2001, Lueck and Michael 2003, Blundell, Francesconi, and Van der Klaauw 2010), one may not know
the number of periods of anticipation effects. Unless the regulation was not at all anticipated until
enacted, there may be pre-enactment anticipation effects. This implies more than k overall periods
of anticipation effects.
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stituting realizations of dt+j for expectations of those variables, thereby implicitly
making a rational expectations assumption. This does not solve the problem so much
as transform it: estimation of the quasi-myopic model will be biased if the unobserved
forecast error is correlated with treatment. In that case, the quasi-myopic model can
still be estimated with instrumental variables to generate consistent estimates of anticipation effects. However, it requires at least S instruments for the S periods of
anticipation effects the researcher seeks to estimate. As we show in the next section,
the exponential discounting model allows one to derive an estimable Euler equation
with just one unobserved expectation term. Thus the researcher will need only one
instrument.

2.3

Exponential discounting model

The third approach to reducing the dimensionality of the forward-looking model is to
assume that treatment has a constant temporary treatment effect of λ0 = β and an
anticipation effect j periods prior to treatment of λj = βθj :
j
yt = βdt + βΣ∞
j=1 θ Et [dt+j ] + et

(4)

The permanent effect of treatment is estimated with β̂/(1 − θ̂). The central benefit
of the assumption that outcomes are a function of exponentially discounted expectations about treatment is that subtracting θyt+1 from (4) will enable the researcher to
generate an Euler equation with only one expectation term.
Before we derive this equation, we pause to note that one cannot, a priori, determine whether the parametric restrictions in the quasi-myopic model or those embodied in exponentially discounted model yield lower bias. If there are more than S
periods of anticipation effects, then the quasi-myopic model suffers omitted variable
bias. But exponential discounting may also be a poor approximation to the time path
of anticipation effects and suffer misspecification bias. It is uncertain which bias is
larger.
The precise Euler equation that corresponds to a forward-looking model with exponentially discounted expectations depends on how agents are assumed to update
their expectations. The natural response – common among macroeconomic and finance econometricians – is to assume a model of belief formation, such as rational
or adaptive expectations, in order to substitute observable variables for unobservable
12

expectations of a variable. Below we derive Euler equations under the assumption
that agents have rational expectations, while we take up adaptive expectations in
Appendix A.1.
In general, when modeling rational expectations, one must specify exactly what
the objects of expectations are and how expectations relate to observed realizations.
There are two possible objects of rational expectations, treatment or outcomes. Moreover, expectations may either depend on realizations (E [z] = z + v) or vice versa
(z = E [z] + v). Economic theory should dictate which path to take. For our application, we have chosen treatment as the object of expectations and have expectations
depend on realizations. We consider alternative formulations of the rational expectations assumption in Appendix A.2.
We formulate the case where agents form rational expectations about treatments
and these expectations are a function of actual treatments as follows: Et [dt+j ] =
d
d
d
is the forecast error resulting
] = 0. The term vt,t+j
where E[dt+j vt,t+j
dt+j + vt,t+j
from an agent’s time-t forecast of the treatment dt+j . This model is appropriate when
treatments are exogenously assigned, as we demonstrate is the case for our application
(see Section 4.3.2). In this case we can substitute the rational expectations assumption
directly into the basic forward-looking model to obtain
j
∞
j d
yt = βΣ∞
j=0 θ dt+j + et + βΣj=1 θ vt,t+j
d
= 0.) After performing the same substitution to
(Since dt is known at time t, vt,t
expand yt+1 , subtracting θyt+1 from yt yields

yt = θyt+1 + βdt + wt

(5)

where
j d
∞
j d
wt = et − θet+1 + βΣ∞
j=1 θ vt,t+j − βΣj=2 θ vt+1,t+j
d
j d
d
= [et − θet+1 ] + βθvt,t+1
+ βΣ∞
j=2 θ [vt,t+j − vt+1,t+j ]

The error term now has three components. One is the change in model error,
et − θet+1 . A second is the error in forecasting time-t + 1 treatment in time t. The
third component is the change in forecasts about time t + j treatment (j > 1) from
time t to time t + 1. There is, however, only one source of endogeneity between
13

outcome yt+1 and the error term: the model error et+1 .18

3

Estimation

This section takes up estimation of anticipation effects models. The focus will be
on estimating the exponential discounting model, though the section will contain
lessons for the quasi-myopic model as well. The Euler equation (5) derived in the
previous section greatly reduced the dimensionality of our forward-looking model (1),
but consistent estimation still requires the researcher to account for the correlation
between yt+1 and the model error et+1 contained in the error term wt . One solution
is to find an instrument.
The usual source for these instruments is a subset of the agent’s information set,
for instance, lags of the endogenous variable (see McCallum 1976).19 This is typically
motivated by modeling the agents’ expectations as a linear projection of the variables
in the agents’ data sets, which include lagged values of the endogenous variable. An
alternative motivation is to note that since lags of yt+1 and yt+1 all depend, according
to the forward-looking model (1), on expectations about future treatment, shocks to
lags of yt+1 will also move yt+1 . The exclusion restriction is completed by noting that
the current period outcome yt in equation (1) does not depend on lagged values of
the endogenous variable.20
The alternative motivation for using lags as instruments also suggests a new set
of instruments we propose here: leads of the endogenous variable.21 Like yt+1 , these
18

d
because, although yt+1 is a function of dt+1 , we have
There is no endogeneity from vt,t+1
d
assumed that dt+1 is orthogonal to vt,t+1
. Nor is there endogeneity from the change in forecasts
d
d
(vt,t+j
− vt+1,t+j
, j > 1) because under rational expectations these forecast updates are orthogonal
d
to prior forecast errors (vt,t+j
) and thus orthogonal to Et [dt+j ] too. Indeed, there is no additional
d
endogeneity even if {dt } are serially correlated because E[dt+j vt,t+j
] = 0 by assumption.
19
For a review of how to estimate a forward-looking rational expectations model, see Blake (1991).
20
This assumes there is no detrimental serial correlation in the error term. We discuss the precise
conditions required for this below.
21
One could alternatively instrument for yt+1 using leads of dt+1 rather than leads of yt+1 since,
after all, shocks to future expectations of dt+1 are what drive identification. Whether this is more
efficient than using leads of yt+1 depends on the variance-covariance structure of model error et and
forecast error vt , which is unknown a priori. However, there is a strong practical reason to prefer
leads of yt+1 : they embed more information than leads of dt+1 for any finite data set. For example,
consider a panel with 10 time periods. Instrumenting for y9 with y10 necessarily includes information
about {d11 , d12 ...} because y10 is a function of future treatments. That information is unavailable
when using leads of d9 , however, because the data set only contains 10 time periods. This advantage
is lessened if data on the future treatments {d11 , d12 , ...}, but not {y11 , y12 , ...}, are available.
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depend, according to the forward-looking model (1), on expectations about future
treatment. Thus {yt+k } for k > 1 are correlated with E [yt+1 ] and are plausible
instruments. Analogizing to models from the dynamic panel literature, we argue
that, although yt+1 may be endogenous, leads of yt+1 are not (i.e., E [yt+j wt ] = 0 for
j > 1) provided that certain conditions on the correlation structure of wt are met.
The intuition for the exclusion restriction is that the Euler equation demonstrates
that yt+1 fully captures the influence of future treatments in the forward-looking
regression. Conditional on yt+1 , therefore, current outcome yt does not depend on
future values of the treatment variables and thus the outcome variable.
The rest of this section carefully describes the conditions required for consistent
estimation.22 We will work with a panel form of our Euler equation that differs slightly
from the Euler equation (5) and the standard autoregressive error components model
in the dynamic panel literature. This panel form will introduce controls xit and fixed
effects ηi . This is not only more general than equation (5), but also allows us to exploit
the similarity between our forward-looking Euler equation (yit = θyit+1 +βdt +ηi +wit )
and the well-known autoregressive error components model (yit = θyit−1 + βdt +
ηi + eit ). Note, however, that our forward-looking Euler equation is not, strictly
speaking, an autoregressive model. (This is easily seen by noting that equation (1),
from which our Euler equation was derived, does not include a lagged dependent
variable.) One implication of this is that while only lags of the outcome variable are
valid instruments in the autoregressive error components model, both lags and leads
are valid instruments in our forward-looking model. We elaborate below.

3.1

Instrumenting with lags and leads

We are interested in estimating a model of the form
yit = θyi,t+1 + αxit + βdit + ηi + wit

(6)

where i = 1...N, t = 1...T , and 0 < θ < 1. We assume that ηi and wit are independently distributed across i with E [ηi ] = E [wit ] = E [ηi wit ] = 0. The number of time
periods T is fixed and the number of individuals N is large. We assume for simplic22

Monte Carlo simulations demonstrating the consistency of our estimator are available upon
request.
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ity that xit is strictly exogenous.23 Although we shall focus here on the validity of
instrumenting with leads, it is easy to adapt our argument to show that lags are also
valid.24
Direct OLS estimation of equation (6) is inconsistent because E [yi,t+1 ηi ] 6= 0. Estimating first differences (defined here as ∆yit = yit −yi,t+1 ) fails because E [∆yi,t+1 ∆wit ] 6=
0. (A within estimator suffers from this same problem, although the bias may disappear as T −→ ∞.) The logic in Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover
(1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) suggests that one solution is to instrument for
∆yi,t+1 using leads of yi,t+1 or to instrument for yi,t+1 using leads of ∆yi,t+1 . Leads
are valid instruments if the following standard assumptions are met:
A1: E [yiT wit ] = 0 ∀ i, ∀ t ≤ T − 1
A2: E [wis wit ] = 0 ∀ t 6= s
A3: E [ηi ∆wi2 ] = 0 ∀ i
Assumption A1 requires yiT to be uncorrelated with past disturbances. Assumption A2 requires these disturbances to be uncorrelated. These two assumptions together imply the following moment conditions:
E [yi,t+j ∆wit ] = 0 ∀ j ≥ 2, ∀ t

(7)

Assumption A3 requires the terminal conditions to be mean stationary. In other
words, conditional on the covariates xit , individuals with large random effects ηi must
not be systematically closer or farther away from their steady states than individuals
with small random effects, so that the terminal conditions are representative of the
steady state behavior of the model. If it holds, A3 implies the following additional
(non-redundant) moment conditions:
E [∆yi,t+1 wit ] = 0 ∀ t

(8)

Equation (6) is overidentified if T > 3 but can be estimated using the Generalized
Method of Moments (GMM) framework developed by Hansen (1982). “Difference
23
24

This exogeneity assumption can be relaxed.
The validity of lags has been shown in earlier papers, e.g., McCallum (1976).
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GMM”estimation exploits the moment conditions (7) while “system GMM”estimation
exploits both (7) and (8).
Assumption A2 is central to the validity of these estimation procedures. As currently stated, however, it is actually stronger than necessary. Limited serial correlation of order H > 0 is acceptable so long as the researcher takes care to omit the
affected instruments and enough instruments remain for identification. We therefore
loosen A2:
A20 : E [wit wit+j ] = 0 ∀ j > H, H ≥ 0
This changes our moment conditions (7) and (8) to
E [yi,t+j ∆wit ] = 0 ∀ j ≥ H + 2, ∀ t
E [∆yi,t+H+1 wit ] = 0 ∀ t
Whether or not these assumptions are satisfied depends on the content of the error
term in the Euler equation, which in turn depends on how expectations are specified.
Following Section 2.3, we consider the case where expectations are a function of
d
treatments: Et [dt+j ] = dt+j + vt,t+j
. (We now drop the i subscript for the remainder
of this section for notational convenience.) The error term for this case, which was
derived in equation (5), is
d
j d
d
wt = et − θet+1 + βθvt,t+1
+ β(Σ∞
j=2 θ [vt,t+j − vt+1,t+j ])

Because wt follows an M A(1) process, it is clear that adjacent outcomes cannot
instrument for each other (e.g., yt+2 is not a valid instrument for yt+1 ). More generally,
we are interested in knowing under what conditions Assumption A20 is satisfied. It
holds if the following four conditions are satisfied for all periods t and individuals i
for some H ≥ 1:
1. E [et et+j ] = 0 ∀ j > H
d
2. E[et vt+j,t+k
] = 0, ∀ k > j, ∀ j > H
d
d
d
3. E[(vt,t+k
− vt+1,t+k
)vt+j,t+j+1
] = 0 ∀ k > 1, ∀ j > H
d
d
d
d
4. E[(vt,t+k
− vt+1,t+k
)(vt+j,t+m
− vt+j+1,t+m
)] = 0 ∀ k > 1, m > j + 1, j > H
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In words, condition 1 means autocorrelation in et cannot be higher than order H.
Condition 2 means the model error is orthogonal to the H-step-ahead-and-beyond
forecast error. Condition 3 means the change in a forecast from period t to period
t + 1 is uncorrelated with the level of a forecast in period t + j. Condition 4 means
independent information is used to update the forecast each period.
Conditions 1, 2 and 4 are plausible in many scenarios, but condition 3 may be an
unrealistic assumption. It holds in the cases of perfect serial correlation (so the change
d
d
d
d
]=
vt+l,t+k
) = 0) or no serial correlation (so E[vt+j,t+j+1
− vt+1,t+k
in forecast (vt,t+k
0 ∀ j, k, l). These two extremes are not satisfied in most applications. Rational expectations, however, offers some hope. It implies that the (perhaps nonzero) expectation
in Condition 3 is not a function of t. In other words, an agent’s forecast error might
depend on whether she is predicting an event three time periods in the future versus
four time periods in the future, but it does not depend on the particular time period
she is forecasting from.
This means we can rewrite our moment conditions (7) and (8) as
E [yt+j ∆et − k1 (j; β, θ)] = 0
E [∆yt+j et − k2 (j; β, θ)] = 0
where k1 (·) and k2 (·) are constants that do not depend on t or our data (x, y). They
will thus be absorbed into our constant term, but the researcher can still identify
the parameters of interest, β and θ.25 Unfortunately, this means we cannot include
multiple instruments: because the moment conditions are a function of j, the nonzero moment condition differs for each instrument. The optimal solution is for the
researcher to specify each instrument as a separate GMM equation and then estimate
the entire system simultaneously.
We have shown theoretically why leads and lags of the endogenous variable can be
used as instruments, but this does not guarantee that these instruments are strong.
Roodman (2009b) documents the danger of using weak instruments, especially when
25
It may appear surprising that we can effectively ignore k1 (·) and k2 (·) even though they are
functions of our parameters. We are able to do this because k1 (·) and k2 (·) are constants and thus
merely represent level shifts of the GMM minimization problem. Consider the analogous problem
2
for OLS: min (y − β1 x1 − β0 − k (β1 )) where k (β1 ) is some constant that is a function of β1 and
β0 ,β1

independent of x1 . Identification of β0 is impossible but OLS can still identify β1 even without
knowing the functional form of k (β1 ).

18

they are numerous. The researcher should take care to perform Hansen, Difference-inSargan, and Arellano-Bond autocorrelation tests to validate her model’s assumptions.
Finally, we note that estimation is further complicated when the treatment variable is both binary and serially correlated, as will often be the case. We discuss how
to handle this in Appendix A.3.

3.2

Deviations from the standard model

The discussion above showed that both lags and leads of the outcome variable are
valid instruments under our standard forward-looking specification when agents have
rational expectations. There are common situations, however, when either lags or
leads are invalid instruments.
For instance, if agents do not continuously update their forecasts of future variables with new, orthogonal information, lags may no longer be valid instruments. To
illustrate why, we examine the case where agents have rational (i.e., unbiased) forecasts of treatment but never update these forecasts.26 This implies the forecast error
d
=
no longer depends on the date the forecast was made, so that Et [dt+j ] = dt+j +vt,t+j
d
dt+j + vt+j . The exponential discounting model may now be written as
j
d
yt = βΣ∞
j=0 θ (dt+j + vt+j ) + et

Subtracting yt+1 yields the Euler equation
yt = θyt+1 + βdt + βθvt+1 + et − θet+1
Lags are necessarily invalid instruments in this specification because yt−j for any j > 1
d
is correlated with future values of vt−j
. Although lags are no longer orthogonal to the
error term in the Euler equation, leads remain valid instruments.
Conversely, if the researcher derives an Euler condition that includes lagged dependent variables, e.g.,
yt = θyt+1 + γyt−1 + βdt + wt
she cannot use leads of yt+1 as instruments for yt+1 .27 Because of serial correlation
26

Carroll (2003) provides evidence that household expectations are not rational, but are based on
professional forecasts, which may be rational. Importantly, he finds that households only occasionally
update their expectations and are therefore “sticky”in the aggregate.
27
Note that yt here is a function of yt−1 but not a function of yt+1 . This is because wt implicitly
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in yt , yt+j for any j > 1 is correlated with yt and thus wt . Now leads are no longer
orthogonal to the error term. Yet lags remain valid instruments.
Although the researcher may not know a priori the appropriate specification of
the forward-looking model, she can use the Sargan/Hansen test of overidentifying
restrictions to test whether instruments are orthogonal to the error term.

4

Application: effect of tort reform on physician
supply

In this section we estimate the effect of tort reform on physician supply using the different methods of estimating anticipation effects we have described. Section 4.1 begins
by providing some background on medical malpractice liability. It then presents a
model that explains why current physician supply depends on expectations about future tort liability rules. The model explains what the coefficients on future tort rules
actually measure. Section 4.2 describes the data we employ. Section 4.3 explains
why one particular tort reform – caps on punitive damages – is a good candidate for
studying anticipation effects. (It is not the only reform that is a reasonable candidate;
we also examine joint and several liability and split recovery rules in the Appendix.)
Specifically, we argue that the change in physician supply prior to adoption of these
caps is better interpreted as anticipation effects rather than as endogeneity or unrelated pre-period trends. Finally, Sections 4.4 and 4.5 explain our empirical models
and report our results. Ultimately, we shall compare estimates of the equilibrium supply effect of punitive damage caps from a myopic model, a quasi-myopic model, and
an exponential discounting model using both leads and lags of the outcome variables
as instruments.

4.1

Background on tort liability and theory

Tort liability is akin to a legally-mandated alteration of the implicit labor contract
between a patient and her physician. In most cases, it requires the physician to provide the quality of care that a “reasonable physician”would provide and compensates
patients who suffer injuries due to inadequate care. Compensation may include economic damages for lost wages and the cost of additional medical care; non-economic
includes a −θet+1 term but not a −θet−1 term.
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damages for pain and suffering from the injury; and punitive damages intended to
punish the doctor for outrageous misconduct.
Tort reform refers to various changes to these mandatory contract terms. Table
2 provides a description of the most common reforms. Most of them, such as caps
on punitive damages, lower the liability of doctors. Others, such as reform of joint
and several liability, which reduces the extent to which hospitals share the liability of
doctors, increase the overall liability of doctors (see Currie and MacLeod 2008).
Policymakers are concerned that tort liability is driving away doctors and thus
reducing patients’ access to care. This claim has received substantial attention from
scholars and the media.28 Here we present a simple model of equilibrium physician
supply that captures the economic intuition underpinning this claim and provides one
motivation for employing the forward-looking regression model (1) in this market.29
Consider a consumer choosing consumption to maximize the present value of her
utility


Et Σ ∞
(9)
j=0 θj U (ct+j )
where we allow the discount factors θj to vary arbitrarily over time. The consumer
can spend her time-t assets At on either consumption ct or health care yt :
c t + p t y t ≤ At
28

See Born, Viscusi, and Baker (2006), Currie and MacLeod (2008), Helland, Klick, and Tabarrok
(2005), Kessler, Sage, and Becker (2005), Klick and Stratmann (2007), Matsa (2007), and Economist
(2005).
29
We do not contend that economic theory implies tort liability must reduce physician supply. For
example, transaction costs may prevent a patient and physician from writing a complete contract
that covers all contingencies, including specific instances of malpractice. In that case, mandatory
terms imposed by tort liability that improve the contract will increase the value of physician care.
We can capture this by modifying (9) to reflect the surplus value v to consumers from physician
liability:


j
Et Σ∞
θ
U
c
+
vΣ
d
y
j
t+j
t−k
t−k
j=0
k=0
Leaving the remainder of the model unchanged, physician supply would still be a linear function of
future tort liability. For example, assuming linear utility means equation (10) would take the form
j
∞
j
yt = s0 + s1 Σ∞
j=0 θ rj + s1 (v − τ ) Σj=0 θ Et [dt+j ]

Prices and thus wages would rise as consumers would be willing to pay extra for the extra value they
provided to consumers. They would fall, as the analysis in the main text suggests, to the extent
that physicians bore the cost of tort liability. The coefficient on expected future liability might be
positive if the former effect exceeds the latter, i.e., v > τ .
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The unit price of physician care is pt . Health care consumption at time t has two
effects on future asset accumulation. First, it functions like an investment that yields
a return rj (net of adverse events) in period t + j. Second, if treatment causes an
adverse event that is discovered in some future period t + j, the tort liability system
requires the physician to pay damages dt+j that period to the consumer.30 Thus
assets at time t are
At = A0 + Σtj=0 rj yt−j + dt Σtj=0 yt−j
The first order condition for the consumer’s problem implies
pt = Σ∞
j=0 θj

U 0 (ct+j )
U 0 (ct+j )
∞
r
+
Σ
θ
Et [dt+j ]
j
j=0 j
U 0 (ct )
U 0 (ct )

where we have assumed {rj } are known at time t, but future tort liability is not. If
consumers discount exponentially (so that θj = θj ) and exhibit either log utility with
the ability to fully smooth consumption or linear utility,31 then the price of physician
care satisfies
j
∞
j
pt = Σ∞
j=0 θ rj + Σj=0 θ Et [dt+j ]
This price is not the same as the physician’s wage because damages are a monetary
transfer from physician to consumer. Damages do not necessarily affect the physician’s wage rate, however, because they may be incorporated into the price. This is
also true with medical malpractice insurance, which converts stochastic future tort
payment into a steady stream of premiums (Baicker and Chandra 2006). Following Currie and MacLeod (2008) (p. 5), however, we assume there is a portion τ of
tort liability that cannot be charged to consumers (e.g., if lawsuits create large overhead and psychic costs for physicians, or cause physicians to practice uncompensated
“defensive medicine”). Thus wages will reflect tort liability:
j
j
∞
j
∞
wt = pt − (1 + τ ) Σ∞
j=0 θ dt+j = Σj=0 θ rj − τ Σj=0 θ Et [dt+j ]

To see how tort liability affects physician supply yt , we specify a linear (or log30

We assume dt+j captures both the probability of detection and the magnitude of the potential
tort damages.
31
Linear utility may be a reasonable approximation for consumers with health insurance, since
they rarely have large out-of-pocket expenses.
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linear) physician supply curve:
j
j
∞
yt = s0 + s1 wt = s0 + s1 Σ∞
j=0 θ rj − s1 τ Σj=0 θ Et [dt+j ]

(10)

This is essentially our forward-looking regression model (1). The coefficient on the
expected liability Et [dt+j ] at time t + j reflects the slope s1 of the physician supply
curve, the fraction τ of liability that is borne by physicians, and the discount factor
θ.32
Several recent studies employ a myopic model instead of (10) to analyze the impact
of tort liability on physician supply. Kessler, Sage, and Becker (2005) perform a
difference-in-differences analysis and find evidence that reforms directly affecting how
much a defendant has to pay increase physician supply by 3%. Matsa (2007) examines
the effect of damage caps on physician supply and finds it increases the supply of
physicians by about 10%, but only in rural counties. Klick and Stratmann (2007)
employ a triple-differences model and estimate that caps on non-economic damages
are associated with a 6% increase in physician supply for high-risk specialties.

4.2

Data

Our analysis uses annual physician count data from the American Medical Association’s Physician Masterfile.33 These counts include private practitioners, hospital
staff, residents, locum tenens, but not military doctors.34 Physicians are categorized
into one of 20 possible specialties and have state identifiers. The data span the period
1980-2001, with gaps in 1984 and 1990.
Klick and Stratmann (2007) note that some physician specialties are sued more
often than others and correspondingly group them into four equally-sized risk tiers,
displayed in Table 1. We use their definitions to limit our data and analysis to the
two riskiest tiers (tiers 1 and 2) because we expect these to be more affected by tort
32

One might object that physicians face large relocation costs that block their exit. However, the
large inflow of new residents and the large potential outflow of retirees may lead to a relatively quick
adjustment on the extensive margin despite high relocation costs (Kessler, Sage, and Becker 2005).
In 1996, approximately five percent of the physicians in our sample were new residents (AMA 1997).
Extrapolating this trend implies that more than one half of all practicing physicians entered the
profession within the past 14 years.
33
This data is also analyzed in Klick and Stratmann (2007). We are grateful to the authors for
sharing their code with us.
34
Locum tenens are temporary, substitute doctors employed by states when there is a shortfall of
doctors.
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liability than the other two tiers.
Figure 4 graphs the total counts over time of the five most populated specialties
in our data set. The supply of general practitioners is declining over time, the supply
of general surgeons is stagnant, and the rest are rising.
Figure 4: Physician supply from 1980 to 2001
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Our tort reform data come from Avraham (2010).35 These data indicate, for the
same time period as our physician supply data, whether ten different tort reforms are
in effect at the state-year level. These reforms are defined in Table 2 and coded as
0-1 indicator variables.

4.3

Evidence for anticipation effects

Among the set of tort reforms that may affect physician supply, we focus on punitive
damage caps. This reform either imposes a specific dollar upper bound such as
$250,000 on punitive awards or requires that punitive awards be no more than a
fraction or multiple of economic damages. We chose punitive damage caps because
35

Klick and Stratmann (2007) and Matsa (2007), by contrast, use tort reform data from the
American Tort Reform Association (ATRA) to estimate the effect of tort reform on physician supply.
Avraham (2010) corrects errors in the ATRA data set and includes data on three additional tort
reforms: split recovery, punitive damage evidence, and caps on punitive damages.
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it is a good candidate for our model of anticipation effects. Specifically, it meets
the following three criteria: (1) physician supply changes prior to enactment of the
reform; (2) the reform is exogenous to physician supply; and (3) there is evidence
that physicians could directly or indirectly anticipate the reform years prior to its
enactment. We provide evidence for this below. In the Appendix, we take up two
other tort reforms – joint and several liability reform and split recovery rules – that
also meet these criteria.
It might be surprising that physician supply responds at all to punitive damages.
It has been reported that punitive damages are awarded in only 1-4% of all medical
malpractice trials (Cohen 2004, Cohen and Harbacek 2011). However, this figure
underestimates the impact of punitive damages. First, according to Table 2, seventeen
states have adopted caps on punitive damages. Since the 1-4% figure is a national
figure, it reflects both states that allow punitive awards and states that cap or prohibit
those awards. Punitive damages will play a larger role in states that do not cap those
damages. Viscusi and Born (2005) estimate that medical malpractice insurers incur
6-7% lower losses in states with caps on punitive damages and 15% lower in states that
ban any punitive awards. Second, even if punitive damages are a small percentage
of awards, they may be the one aspect of tort damages that cannot be insured by
physicians. Nearly half the states do not allow malpractice liability insurance to
cover punitive damages (Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman, and Dicker LLP 2008,
McCullough, Campbell, and Lane LLP 2004). Moreover, even in states that allow
liability insurance to conver punitive damages, many insurers refuse to do so. Viscusi
and Born (2005) also estimate that medical malpractice insurers incur 6-7% lower
losses in states that prohibit insurance coverage of punitive awards. Given that 98.8%
of total malpractice awards are covered by liability insurance (Zeiler, Silver, Black,
Hyman, and Sage 2007), this implies that punitives are a disproportionate source of
risk to doctors, perhaps more than 83% (= 6%/(6% + 1.2%)) of all financial risk they
bear from medical malpractice liability. It is not surprising, therefore, that a number
of papers that examine medical malpractice tort reform have found a significant effect
of punitive damages on physician behavior (e.g., Avraham 2007, Avraham, Dafny, and
Schanzenbach 2010, and Currie and MacLeod 2008).
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4.3.1

Physician supply changed prior to enactment of punitive damage
caps

Figure 5 shows that six reforms in our data – including caps on punitive damage –
exhibit a supply change prior to enactment of the reform, even after controlling for
state-specialty and specialty-year fixed effects.36 Some of these trends continue after
the law was adopted, suggesting there may have been ex post adjustment, but a good
portion of the change occurs before the reform is adopted. Importantly, the change in
supply prior to adoption of caps on punitive damages is positive, which is consistent
with physicians anticipating a liability-reducing reform.
4.3.2

Punitive damage caps are exogenous to physician supply

Although a change in outcomes prior to treatment is consistent with anticipation
effects, it does not rule out the possibility of endogeneity. For example, changes in
physician supply may induce changes in tort laws (reverse causality) or an unobserved
set of factors may cause both changes in physician supply and tort reforms (omitted
variable bias). We now present evidence ruling out these two possible explanations.
First, unlike other reforms, punitive damage caps are generally targeted at all tort
suits, not just medical malpractice suits.37 This is verified in Table 3, which lists the
specific states that adopted different reforms. States that adopted reforms that were
restricted in application to medical malpractice suits are listed in bold. Out of 17
states that adopted caps on punitive damages, only five states restricted the reform
to medical malpractice cases.38
Furthermore, we can rule out specific channels by which physician supply might be
thought to effect adoption of punitive damage caps. For example, one might suppose
that state legislatures are public-spirited and decrease liability only when physician
supply falls. Figure 5b demonstrates this phenomenon for states that adopted caps
on total damages: a steady decline in physician supply is followed by a large increase
once this liability-reducing reform is adopted. By contrast, Figure 5a shows that the
exact opposite occurred for caps on punitive damages: supply rose prior to adoption.
Another potential channel for endogeneity is that legislatures could be captured by
doctors so that, when the supply of doctors is high, legislatures reduce liability. Yet
36

Figure 5a replicates Figure 1 from the introduction.
Currie and MacLeod (2008) makes a similar argument for the exogeneity of this reform.
38
We exclude these five states from our main specification.
37
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Figure 5: Tort reforms exhibiting pre-period changes in behavior
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Note: These figures plot the normalized coefficients λj from the following regression: ln yist = Σ5j=−5 λj Dst+j +
γXist + uist , where yist is physician count for specialty i in state s in year t, Dst+j is an indicator for whether reform
was first adopted in period t + j, and Xist includes state-specialty and specialty-year fixed effects.
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Figure 6: Fraction of states adopting reform from 1980-2001 by quartile of physician
supply
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Note: states are assigned to quartiles based on the total number of per capita physicians in a state in 1980. Total
damage caps and victims’ fund reforms are excluded due to insufficient number of adoptions.

there does not appear to be a connection between states with high physician supply
and states with punitive damage caps. This can be verified in Figure 6, which plots
the fraction of states that ever adopt different tort reforms by quartile of physician
supply in 1980. There does not appear to be a correlation between supply and
adoption for punitive damage caps. By contrast there are clear patterns suggesting a
public-spirited model for contingency fee reforms and a legislative capture model for
punitive damage evidence reform.
Finally, we also obtained annual state-level data on government medical benefits
and per-capita income from the Regional Economic Information System in order to
examine whether any of them might explain adoption of punitive damage caps. We
found no statistically significant differences in these variables between states that
adopted and states that did not adopt punitive damage caps.39
Pre-period trends
An alternative possibility raised by the pre-post plots in Figure 5 is that pretreatment changes in outcomes reflect pre-period trends in the treatment states rather
39

Because many states adopted caps on punitive damage during our sample period, we performed
our analysis for several different years: 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995, and 2000.
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than anticipation effects. If there were a pre-treatment trend aside from anticipation
effects, however, one might expect it for all reforms in our data. Yet Figure 7 shows
that the other four reforms in our data display no discernible changes in supply prior
to anticipation. Moreover, Figure 5 shows that different reforms have different preperiod trends. This is true even if we examine only the reforms that reduce liability
(all but Figure 5d).
More fundamentally, the concern about pre-period trends in treatment states is
just a variant of the claim that treatment was endogenous. The arguments we use to
rule out the tort reforms we study as endogenous in levels can also be used to rule out
endogeneity in trends. For example, it is difficult to understand why public-interest
minded states would pass punitive damage caps to lower liability when physician
supply was already trending upwards. Physician political power does not explain our
observations either: Figure 5a suggests that – relative to the pre-trend – caps reduced
physician supply. This is counterintuitive because damage caps decrease liability, so
one would expect them to increase, not decrease, supply.
Even if we could not rule out endogeneity in this manner, one must still justify
why, among the two possible explanations for pre-period trends – endogeneity and
anticipation effects – one should default to endogeneity. If the correct explanation
is actually anticipation effects, filtering out pre-trends with state-specific trends to
address endogeneity will cause one not only to underestimate permanent treatment
effects, but also perhaps to estimate the wrong sign on treatment effects. We illustrate this in Figure 8. Panel A displays a level increase in outcomes at time-t due to
time-t treatment. It then plots a dotted state-specific trend for treatment states. It is
easy to see that, even without anticipation effects, state trends reduce the magnitude
of level treatment effects and, for a given level of variance in unobservables, reduce
the probability that the level treatment effect will be estimated as significant, a point
previously made by Wolfers (2006). Panel B modifies the treatment in Panel A by
adding anticipation effects to the pre-period. Now the dotted state-specific trend
will not only reduce the estimated level treatment effect, but also it may even cause
the estimated effect to be negative rather than positive! The use of a state-specific
pre-trend would reduce this risk, but only because it is an alternate parameterization
of anticipation effects, namely a model with linear discounting rather than exponential discounting of anticipation effects. The lesson is that insertion of state-specific
trends or state-specific pre-trends must have a theoretical justification, else they may
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Figure 7: Tort reforms exhibiting no change in pre-period behavior
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Figure 8: State-specific trends can bias estimation

(a) No anticipation
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Time
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Note: In panel A, the state-specific trend causes the researcher to underestimate the magnitude of the treatment
effect. In panel B, it causes the researcher to estimate the wrong sign of the treatment effect.

introduce bias into the estimation.
4.3.3

Punitive damage caps were anticipated

Ruling out endogeneity is a necessary condition for estimating anticipation effects
but it may not be sufficient. We must show that physicians had both motive and
capacity to anticipate the reforms we examine, our third criteria. Physicians have
a large incentive to care about tort reform: variations in liability regimes across
states have large impacts on their income. For example, neurosurgeons in St. Clair
county, Illinois, paid an average premium of $228,396 in 2004, but their colleagues in
neighboring Wisconsin paid less than one-fifth of that (Economist 2005). Moreover,
they can be alerted to forthcoming reform through at least two possible channels:
newspapers and insurance premiums.
Newspaper articles discussing upcoming legislation can directly inform physicians
about potential future reforms. To verify this, we searched for newspaper stories
about punitive damage caps prior to adoption of that reform. For example, in Pennsylvania, a large adopter, we found over 80 articles during the two years prior to
adoption of reform in 1997. One article published about two years prior to enactment
wrote that “the key goals of the [state] administration...have been to place a cap on
punitive-damage awards”(Siegel 1995). We describe these findings in greater detail
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in Appendix A.4.
One might argue that physicians are not sophisticated enough to understand the
impact of particular reforms on their liability exposure. Medical malpractice insurance companies, however, are certainly well informed about these reforms and it is
possible that they indirectly signal forthcoming reform to physicians by decreasing
premiums when expected future physician liability decreases.40 Figure 9 displays the
premiums per capita for Pennsylvania during the period 1980-2001. Pennsylvania
enacted punitive damage caps in 1997. This reform decreases liability and, indeed,
we observe a decrease in premiums prior to this year. In 2002 Pennsylvania enacted
another reform which raised liability (joint and several) and two reforms which decrease liability (split recovery and periodic payment). The rise in premiums prior to
2002 again suggests that joint and several reform was also anticipated by insurance
companies.
Of course, one should not make strong inferences from this figure since it represents
only one state and does not include any controls. In Figure 10, however, we plot
medical malpractice premiums in the period leading up to enactment of punitive
damage caps for all 50 states. This plot, which controls for state and year fixed effects,
shows a fall in premiums prior to adoption. This is consistent with the increase in
physician supply shown in Figure 1.41

4.4

Empirical model

We estimate the effect of tort reform on the log of physician supply using a differencein-differences strategy. Treatment effects are identified by comparing within-state
changes in high-risk physician supply (tiers 1 and 2 in Table 1) in states that adopt
reform in a year to within-state changes in supply among states that do not adopt
in that year.42 It would be sufficient to include state and year fixed effects to im40

This is not inconsistent with the fact that some states prohibit insurance coverage for punitive
damages. Most states do not, and in those states premiums may signal forthcoming punitive damage
caps. In Pennsylvania, for example, punitive damages assessed via vicarious liability, e.g., through
physician groups, are insurable.
41
Appendix A.5 shows corresponding pre-trends in insurance premiums also exist for joint and
several and split recovery reforms.
42
We also separately estimated our models including all four risk tiers instead of only the two highrisk ones. This reduced the significance for joint and several and split recovery reforms, as expected.
Our estimate of the effect of punitive damage caps, however, was more significant, suggesting that
this reform has a broad impact across all specialties.
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Figure 9: Per capita insurance premiums for Pennsylvania
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Note: Premium data are from AM Best. These plots display the direct premiums earned in a given calendar year
divided by the number of high-risk physicians in that year. Physician data for 1984 and 1990 are interpolated.
Amounts are in 1984 dollars.

plement our difference-in-differences estimator. However, we go further and employ
state-specialty and specialty-year fixed effects. The former control for specialty-level
unobservables within each state. The latter allow time paths for physician supply to
vary across specialty, as Figure 4 suggests may be appropriate.
We must select a pre and a post period in order to implement our differencein-differences design. We could use the entire 1980-2001 panel to calculate these
contrasts but this is unappealing: observations from states that adopted reform early
(late) would receive less weight in the pre (post) period than states that adopted
reform later (earlier). Figure 11 shows that all caps on punitive awards were adopted
in the period 1984 to 1998 (the circled points). Given the 1980 beginning and 2001
end of our sample, we implement the widest window that ensures full pre and post
coverage for each treated state: a 9-year pre-post moving window that includes the 5
years preceding adoption of punitive caps and the 4 years after adoption.
We first estimate a myopic model to serve as a baseline:
ln yist = β0 dst + γis + γit + uist

(11)

The outcome yist is the number of physicians per capita practicing specialty i in state
s in period t, dst is an indicator for reform in state s in period t, and γis and γit are
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Figure 10: Excess amount of premiums before and after reform: annual leads and lags
from 5 years before to 5 years after adoption
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Note: Premium data are from AM Best. This plot displays the normalized coefficients λj from the OLS regression
ln yst = Σ5j=−5 λj Dst+j + γs + γt + ust , where yst is the total amount of direct premiums earned in state s in time t
divided by the number of high-risk physicians in state s in time t, Dst is a dummy variable that takes on the value
of 1 only in the year that a state adopts reform, and γs and γt are state and year fixed effects. Standard errors are
clustered by state.

state-specialty and specialty-year fixed effects, respectively.
We then estimate four quasi-myopic models that include up to four leading indicators for whether a law was passed:
ln yist = β0 dst + ΣSj=1 βj Ds,t+j + γis + γit + uist

(12)

S = 1 . . . 4 is the number of leading indicators in the regression and Ds,t+j is a dummy
variable equal to 1 if a reform was adopted in time period t+j. For example, if a reform
is adopted in period 5, then Ds,t+1 = 1 in period 4 and 0 otherwise. We parameterize
the quasi-myopic model using treatment adoption dummies Ds,t+j rather than merely
concurrent treatment dummies dst so that regression coefficients directly identify the
parameters of interest: The permanent treatment effect is estimated by β̂0 and the
temporary effect is estimated by β̂0 − β̂1 .43
Finally we estimate the model we derived in Section 4.1, where physician supply
43

Section 1 defines what we mean by “temporary” and “permanent” treatment effects.
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Figure 11: Cumulative number of states adopting punitive damage caps
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is modeled as a function of exponentially discounted expectations of tort reforms:
j
ln yist = βdst + βΣ∞
j=1 θ Et [ds,t+j ] + γis + γit + εist

We assume agents have rational expectations of future tort reforms and tort reform
is exogenous:44
d
Et [ds,t+j ] = ds,t+j + vt,t+j
This yields the estimable Euler equation
ln yist = θ ln yis,t+1 + βdst + γis + γit + wist
d
j d
d
where wist = εit − θεi,t+1 + βθvt,t+1
+β(Σ∞
j=2 θ [vt,t+j − vt+1,t+j ]).
As discussed in the Appendix, binary treatment variables cause dst to be endogenous if it is serially correlated over time. Adding a lead of the treatment variable
to the estimation equation is sufficient to address this problem because our reformgenerating process follows an AR(1) process.45 Thus, our estimable Euler equation
44

We also estimated an exponential discounting model, described in Appendix A.1, where agents
have adaptive expectations. That analysis, available upon request, yielded estimates of the discount factor θ outside of the [0, 1] interval. Because this is non-sensical, we conclude that adaptive
expectations is not a good assumption for our model of physician supply.
45
To confirm this, we estimated the following state-level regression for each tort reform: dst =
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becomes
ln yist = θ ln yis,t+1 + βdst + δds,t+1 + γis + γit + wist

(13)

We estimate equation (13) first using OLS, then using our proposed leads of ln yis,t+1
as instruments, and finally using lags of ln yis,t+1 as instruments. We employ all
available instruments in each category; restricting the number of instruments does
not substantively affect our results.
We weight all our estimations by state population because yist is a per capita measure. Following the recommendations of Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004),
we allow for arbitrary serial correlation in the error term as well as arbitrary crosssectional correlation within states when computing standard errors.46 We employ
one-step GMM estimation when estimating the exponential discounting models to
alleviate concerns about finite sample problems associated with two-step GMM estimation as discussed in Judson and Owen (1999) and Doran and Schmidt (2006). We
transform our data using forward orthogonal deviations instead of the usual first differences when estimating the exponential discounting models because this preserves
sample size in panels with gaps.47 The GMM standard error estimates and Arellano
and Bond’s autocorrelation test assume error terms are uncorrelated across panels.
The specialty-year fixed effects we include in our estimations increase the likelihood
that this assumption holds.
Recall that punitive damage caps are most likely to be exogenous in states where
the reform is not targeted solely at medical malpractice cases (see Table 3). We
therefore exclude potentially endogenous states when performing our estimations.48
Furthermore, our main specification excludes other tort reforms as controls because
their endogeneity could contaminate our estimates. To allow for the possibility that
we have been too conservative in enforcing exogeneity, however, we also estimate an
alternative specification that includes all states and controls for all other tort reforms.
α1 xst + α2 dst−1 + α3 dst−2 + est , where xst is a vector of controls that includes all other tort reforms.
Our results (not reported) show that, at a 5% level of significance, α2 is significant for all ten
tort reforms while α3 is insignificant for nine of them, which provides good support for our AR(1)
assumption. These regressions clustered standard errors at the state level and were unweighted.
46
Clustering by state may overestimate standard errors if there are constant treatment effects
and unobserved shocks occur at the risk-tier rather than state level. Re-estimating our model with
standard errors clustered by risk-tier increases the significance of our reported estimates.
47
Recall that we do not have data on physician counts for 1984 or 1990. See Arellano and Bover
(1995) and Roodman (2009a) for descriptions of the orthogonal deviations transform.
48
Specifically, we exclude CO, IL, OR, PA, and WI from the punitive damage caps analysis.
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4.5

Results

Table 4 reports estimates from the myopic model (0 leads) and versions of the quasimyopic model (1−4 leads). The coefficient estimates on the time-t treatment variable
identify the permanent effect of reform, including anticipation effects, and can be
interpreted as relative changes in physician supply. Column 1 estimates that punitive
damage caps reduced physician supply by 3.9%. Moving across the first row reveals
that the estimated permanent effect monotonically increases from 3.9% to 5.0% as
we add leads. All estimates are significant.
Next we turn to estimates for our exponential discounting model. Under rational
expectations, the regression model is given by the Euler equation (13). Column
1 of Table 5 reports OLS estimates of this equation. These estimates, although
statistically significant, are inconsistent because OLS estimation of equation (13)
does not account for the correlation between the error term and yis,t+1 . Column 2
estimates the Euler equation using leads of yis,t+1 as instruments for yis,t+1 . The
estimated temporary and permanent effects of punitive damage caps are significant
at 2.2% and 5.7%, respectively. Finally, column 3 reports results when we uses lags
of yist rather than leads to instrument for yis,t+1 . The estimated effects are similar to
those estimated using leads as instruments.
Table 5 also displays results for the Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions
and Arellano and Bond’s autocorrelation test. Both tests support the validity of the
instruments we use for our exponential discounting model. A remaining concern is
that our instrument collection is overfitting our model (and also possibly weakening
the power of our Hansen test, as discussed in Roodman 2009b). We address this by
alternatively estimating our models using only two lags or two leads as instruments.
Those results are similar in both magnitude and significance to what we report in
Table 5.
Specification 1 in Table 6 summarizes the results from Tables 4 and 5. All estimates are strongly significant. In Section 2.1, we explained that imperfect correlation
between time-t reform status and future reform status means that the estimated
treatment effect in a myopic model likely underestimates the permanent effect of reform.49 Including leads reduces this bias by reducing omitted variable bias. Table
6 shows that the estimated effects from a quasi-myopic model are larger than the
49
This assumes temporary treatment effects and anticipation effects have the same sign and that
current treatment is positively correlated with future treatment, on average.
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corresponding estimates from the myopic model, as predicted. The fact that these
estimates increase as we keep adding leads to the quasi-myopic model suggests that
each additional lead moves us closer to an unbiased estimate of the permanent effect.
Combining this with our result that the exponential discounting model yields even
larger estimates of the permanent effect of tort reform strongly suggests that anticipation effects matter and for perhaps longer than our data permit in the quasi-myopic
model.
Specification 2 in Table 6 reports results when we include the nine other, potentially endogenous, tort reforms as controls and exclude no states. Compared to
Specification 1, the magnitude of the estimated effects are larger for the quasi-myopic
model and insignificant for the exponential discounting model. We still observe an
increase in the estimated permanent effect for this reform as we add leads to the
quasi-myopic model.
Like other prior studies on this topic, we do not account for general equilibrium
effects. A physician fleeing one state necessarily enters another, magnifying the relative supply differences between the two states. Kessler, Sage, and Becker (2005) have
previously demonstrated, however, that most of the equilibrium adjustment comes
from newly graduated residents deciding where to practice and retirees leaving practice. Furthermore, we are primarily interested in the relative differences between
our model estimates, for it is these relative differences that reveal the importance of
anticipation effects.
Our results are consistent with Currie and MacLeod (2008), which finds that joint
and several liability (examined in our Appendix) and punitive damage caps have a
significant effect on birth outcomes. They find only limited evidence of anticipation,
but this is probably due to their inclusion of state×time fixed effects. This can bias
estimation of anticipation effects, as shown in Figure 8.

5

Conclusion

There is a wide array of applied economics topics in which a researcher may be
confronted with forward-looking agents whose responses anticipate future treatment.
Economic theory suggests, for example, that individuals are forward looking when
purchasing durable goods such as cars or houses or making human capital investments,
and that firms are forward looking when investing in physical capital or entering new
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markets. While not all economic decisions are made with an eye towards the future
and not all shocks are anticipated, enough are that empirical work should consider
how to define and estimate treatment effects in the context of anticipation effects.
This paper develops a framework that addresses the two basic problems with
estimating forward looking models: the researcher does not know to what extent
agents are forward looking and cannot observe their expectations. The framework
itself posits that outcomes are additively separable in each period’s expectations.
We discuss two sets of parametric restrictions on expectations terms: one that caps
the number of terms the researcher has to consider (the quasi-myopic model) and
another that restricts their influence in a manner that allows differencing to eliminate
all but one expectation term (the exponential discounting model). We also discuss
two ways of relating unobserved expectations to observables: rational expectations
in the text and adaptive expectations in the Appendix. For each we discuss some
instruments that can be employed to address measurement errors that arise when
using variables as proxies for unobservable expectations. Our application illustrated
the potential importance of accounting for anticipation effects. Both the quasi-myopic
and exponential discounting model suggest that the permanent effect of the tort
reforms we study are double that suggested by a myopic model.
The framework has a number of limitations. Foremost, we offer no clean test that
distinguishes between the presence of anticipation effects versus endogeneity. We
merely provide informal evidence in favor of anticipation and thus our framework.
Further, within our framework, we offer no formal way to discriminate between the
different sets of parametric restrictions (i.e., the quasi-myopic and exponential discounting models) we discuss. There may be other restrictions a researcher might
employ or estimation strategies that do not require any restrictions at all. For example, if two agents were both treated but one found out about the treatment earlier
than the other, one could estimate anticipation effects with a difference-in-differences
estimator that would eliminate many expectations terms. Likewise, there may be
alternative models of updating or belief formation that can be employed. Ideally the
researcher would directly survey agents about their expectations or at least survey a
subsample to empirically estimate the relationship between expectations and unobservables. Even where this is not possible, there are gains to specifying a more general
model of forecasting than rational or adaptive expectations, even one that includes
both future realizations of the forecasted variable as well as past forecasting errors.
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Each of these limitations is a useful topic for future research.
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Tables
Table 1: Physician specialties by risk tier
Tier 1

Tier 2

Tier 3

Tier 4

Emergency medicine

Anesthesiology

Diabetes

General practice
Neurological surgery
Obstetrics & gynecology
Thoracic surgery

General surgery
Orthopedic surgery
Plastic surgery

Allergy & immunology
Dermatology
Nephrology
Physical medicine &
rehabilitation
Rheumatology

Radiology

Medical oncology
Neoplastic diseases
Psychiatry
Public
health
&
general
preventive
medicine

Source: Klick and Stratmann (2007). Specialties in tier 1 exhibit the highest average medical malpractice award per
doctor and specialties in tier 4 exhibit the lowest average.

Table 2: Tort reform descriptions
Tort reform

Description

Collateral source

Allows damages to be reduced by the value
of compensatory payments already made to
the plaintiff
Places limits on attorney contingency fees
Limits damages recoverable from parties
only partially responsible for the plaintiff’s
harm
Limits awards for noneconomic damages in
malpractice cases
Requires part or all of damages to be paid
in the form of an annuity
Prohibits or limits recovery of punitive
damages from physicians
Requires plaintiff to show by clear and convincing evidence that a defendant acted
recklessly
Requires some of the punitive damages to
go to a state fund for uncompensated tort
victims
Limits awards for total damages
Establishes a no-fault compensation fund
for medical malpractice victims

Contingency fees
Joint and several

Noneconomic damage caps
Periodic payment
Punitive damage caps
Punitive evidence

Split recovery

Total damage caps
Victims’ fund

Source: Avraham (2010).
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Table 3: Summary of tort reform laws enacted during 1980-2001
Tort reform

States enacting tort reform

Collateral source

AL (87), CO (87), CT (85), HI (87),
ID (90), IN (87), KY (89), MA (87), ME
(90), MI (86), MN (85), MT (88), ND (88),
NJ (88), NY (85), OR (88), UT (87), WI
(95)
CT (87), FL (86), HI (87), IL (85), MA
(87), ME (89), MI (85), NH (87), UT
(86)
AK (86), AZ (87), CA (86), CO (87), CT
(87), FL (86), GA (88), HI (87), IA (84),
ID (88), LA (81), MI (87), MN (89), MO
(86), MS (90), MT (88), ND (88), NE (92),
NH (90), NJ (88), NM (82), NY (87), TN
(92), TX (86), UT (86), WA (86), WI (94),
WV (86), WY (86)
AL (87), CO (87), HI (87), KS (87),
MD (87), MN (86), MO (86), MT (96),
ND (96), OR (88), UT (88), WI (95)
AZ (89), CO (89), CT (88), FL (87), IA
(88), ID (88), IL (86), IN (85), LA (85),
MD (87), ME (87), MI (86), MN (89),
MO (86), MT (87), NY (86), OH (88),
RI (88), SD (88), UT (86), WA (86)
AK (98), AL (87), CO (87), GA (88), IL
(85), IN (95), KS (88), NC (96), ND (93),
NH (87), NJ (96), NV (89), OK (96), OR
(88), PA (97), VA (89), WI (85)
AK (86), AL (87), AZ (87), CA (88), DC
(96), FL (00), GA (88), IA (87), ID (88),
IN (84), KS (88), KY (89), MD (92), ME
(85), MO (86), MS (94), MT (85), NC (96),
ND (87), NJ (96), NV (89), OH (88), OK
(87), OR (88), SC (88), TN (92), TX (88),
UT (90), WI (95)
AK (98), CO (87), FL (87), IA (87), IN
(96), OR (88), UT (90)
CO (89), SD (86)
ND (83)

Contingency fees
Joint and several

Noneconomic damage caps
Periodic payment

Punitive damage caps

Punitive evidence

Split recovery
Total damage caps
Victims’ fund

Source: Avraham (2010). Year of enactment given in parentheses. Bold face indicates the reform
applies to medical malpractice torts only.
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Table 4: Myopic and quasi-myopic (QM) estimates for punitive damage caps
Number of leads
Tort reform
Punitive damage caps

(0)

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

0.039**
(0.018)

0.042**
(0.020)
0.012
(0.010)

0.045*
(0.022)
0.015
(0.014)
0.008
(0.011)

0.050**
(0.025)
0.020
(0.016)
0.014
(0.013)
0.015*
(0.008)

0.050*
(0.026)
0.020
(0.017)
0.014
(0.014)
0.015
(0.010)
-0.000
(0.006)

Myopic
6,363
0.989

QM
6,363
0.989

QM
6,363
0.989

QM
6,363
0.989

QM
6,363
0.989

Lead (t+1)
Lead (t+2)
Lead (t+3)
Lead (t+4)
Model
Observations
R2

Dependent variable is log of count of high-risk physicians per 100,000 population. Reported treatment effects compare within-state changes in adopting versus non-adopting states. Standard errors,
given in parentheses, are clustered by state. A */** next to the coefficient indicates significance at
the 10/5% level.

Table 5: Exponential discounting model estimates for punitive damage caps
Tort reform
Punitive damage caps (permanent effect)
Punitive damage caps (temporary effect)
b
Discount rate (θ)
Estimation method
IV
Observations
R2
Hansen test (p-value)
AR(3) test (p-value)

(1)

(2)

(3)

0.046**
(0.018)
0.015**
(0.005)
0.665**
(0.060)

0.057**
(0.017)
0.022**
(0.007)
0.622**
(0.098)

0.064**
(0.027)
0.022**
(0.007)
0.654**
(0.100)

OLS
None
5,389
0.994

GMM
Leads
4,448

GMM
Lags
5,089

1
0.686

1
0.763

Dependent variable is log of count of high-risk physicians per 100,000 population. Reported treatment effects compare within-state changes in adopting versus non-adopting states. Standard errors,
given in parentheses, are clustered by state. A */** next to the coefficient indicates significance
at the 10/5% level. Permanent effect is defined as the temporary effect divided by one minus the
discount rate. Column (2) instruments for the endogenous variable yist+1 with all available leads of
yist+1 . Column (3) alternatively instruments with all available lags of yist+1 . The AR(3) test checks
for order-3 serial correlation in the residuals.
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Table 6: Summary of estimated permanent effects for punitive damage caps
Specification
Model

IV

Myopic
Quasi-myopic (1 lead)
Quasi-myopic (2 leads)
Quasi-myopic (3 leads)
Quasi-myopic (4 leads)
Exponential discounting
Exponential discounting

None
None
None
None
None
Lags
Leads

(1)

(2)

0.039**
0.042**
0.045*
0.050**
0.050*
0.064**
0.057**

0.045**
0.046**
0.050**
0.056**
0.059**
0.049
0.054

Dependent variable is log of count of high-risk physicians per 100,000 population. Reported treatment effects compare within-state changes in adopting versus non-adopting states. A */** next to
the coefficient indicates significance at the 10/5% level. Specification 1 summarizes the previous
results from Tables 4 and 5. Specification 2 includes all 50 states in the analysis and adds the nine
other (potentially endogenous) tort reforms in our data set as controls.
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A
A.1

Appendix
Adaptive expectations

In this section we derive an estimable Euler equation under the assumption that agents
have adaptive expectations and show how to estimate it. One can show that the object
of the agent’s expectations (outcomes or treatment) does not affect identification of
β or θ. For ease of exposition we assume agents have adaptive expectations about
outcomes:
Et [yt+1 ] = Et [yt+j ] = φyt + (1 − φ) Et−1 [yt ]
Plugging these equations into equation (16) and simplifying yields
yt = θφyt + θ (1 − φ) Et−1 [yt ] + βdt + εt

(14)

The one-step back version of equation (16) is:
yt−1 = θEt−1 [yt ] + βdt−1 + εt−1
Solve this for Et−1 [yt ] and plug the result into (14). Simplifying then produces the
estimable Euler equation
yt = γ (1 − φ) yt−1 + γβdt − γβ (1 − φ) dt−1 + γεt − γ (1 − φ) εt−1
where γ ≡ 1/ (1 − θφ). Time-t outcomes are now a function of past rather than future
outcomes. The reason is that adaptive expectations is a backward-looking model of
learning. The coefficient on current treatment no longer directly identifies β, though
that parameter can be identified. Finally, the only source of endogeneity is previous
period model error: E [yt−1 εt−1 ] 6= 0. Estimation is therefore straight-forward: use
lags of order three or deeper and/or leads of order one or higher as instruments.

A1

A.2

Rational expectations about outcomes

Consider the case where the agent is able to form rational expectations about outcomes.50 Initially we assume realizations are a function of expectations: yt+j =
y
y
Et [yt+j ] + vt,t+j
, where vt,t+j
indicates the error given time t expectations about outy
comes in time t + j and E[Et [yt+j ] vt,t+j
] = 0. This model is appropriate, for example,
where outcomes are stock prices since realizations of stock prices are a composite of
expectations (e.g., Chow 1989). Expectations at time t about θyt+1 are


j
θEt [yt+1 ] = Et θβΣ∞
j=0 θ Et+1 [dt+1+i ]

(15)

since Et [et+1 ] = 0. Subtracting (15) from (4) yields the Euler equation
yt = θEt [yt+1 ] + βdt + et

(16)

Plugging in our rational expectations assumption produces the estimation equation
yt = θyt+1 + βdt + wt

(17)

y
where wt = et − θvt,t+1
.
The error term has two components, model error (et ) and unexpected, mean-zero
y
forecast error (vt,t+1
), that cause outcomes to deviate from forecasts. Thus rational
expectations introduces measurement error. The result is endogeneity between next
y
period’s outcome yt+1 and vt,t+1
. Furthermore, if {dt } are serially correlated, then dt
y
would be correlated with yt+1 and thus vt,t+1
through dt+1 .
If we had instead assumed expectations about outcomes were a function of actual
y
y
] = 0, then there would be
outcomes, i.e., Et [yt+j ] = yt+j + vt,t+j
where E[yt+j vt,t+j
y
no endogeneity. The Euler equation would look the same, but wt = et + θvt,t+1
. By
assumption yt+1 is exogenous, and even with serial correlation in {dt } we would have
y
E[dt vt,t+1
] 6= 0.
Estimating this model is straightforward. Suppose that expectations are a function
y
of outcomes and Et [yt+1 ] = yt+1 + vt+1
.51 Our error term is
y
wt = et + θvt+1
50

We ignore the role of covariates xt to simplify the exposition. However, it is straightforward to
incorporate covariates into the analysis.
y
51
If outcomes are a function of expectations (yt+1 = Et [yt+1 ] + vt+1
), then yt+1 is exogenous and
no instruments are required.
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The analogue to Assumption A20 is that, for some constant H,

y
y
E [wt wt+j ] = E[ et − θvt+1
(et+j − θvt+j+1
)] = 0 ∀ j > H
If et and vty are serially and mutually uncorrelated then the usual difference and system
GMM estimators can be used so long as Assumptions A1 and A3 hold. Limited
correlation in the error term can be accommodated by using higher order leads.

A.3

Binary treatment variables

In many applications the treatment variable, dt , is binary. The forecast error corresponding to rational expectations of a binary variable is necessarily mean reverting,
d
which induces a negative correlation between dt+j and vt,t+j
.52 If treatment states
d
] 6= 0 and the erare correlated over time then endogeneity occurs because E[dt vt,t+j
0
ror term will be serially correlated, violating Assumption A2 from Section 3.1. This
problem can be resolved if agent forecasts follow a Markov process because then future
treatment states can be used to absorb the endogeneity. More specifically, suppose
that
d
d
Cov[dt , vt,t+j
|dt+1 , dt+2 ..., dt+K ] = Cov[dt , vt+1,t+1+j
|dt+1 , dt+2 ..., dt+K ]

= 0∀t, ∀j > 0, K ≥ 1
Note that this assumption can be tested by running simple OLS regressions. If the
assumption holds, one can then consistently estimate our Euler equation
yt = θyt+1 + αxt + βdt + ΣK
k=1 δk dt+k + ηi + wt
where dt is binary and dt+k accounts for endogeneity.

A.4

Discussion of reforms in newspapers

In this section we provide evidence that the three tort reforms we examine (punitive
damage caps in the main text, and joint and several reform and split recovery in
Appendix A.5) were discussed in local newspapers years prior to actual passage of
these reforms. We first determine, for each reform, the largest state that adopted it.
We then search the online archives of the two largest newspapers in that state for
52

d
Recall that vt,t+j
is defined as the forecast error from the time-t forecast of dt+j
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articles pertaining to the reform in question.53 Some states do not have searchable
databases of articles from local newspapers that span the period before adoption of
reform. In those cases we search the archives of local papers for the next-largest state
that adopted the reform.
California reformed its joint and several liability rules on June 3, 1986. Two large
local newspapers, the Los Angeles Times and the San Diego Union-Tribune, have
archives going back to January 01, 1985 and December 05, 1983, respectively. We
searched the online archives of these two papers from their earliest available point up
through June 3, 1986 and found 84 articles mentioning “joint and several”, 20 articles
mentioning both “joint and several”and “tort reform”, and 19 articles mentioning
“medical malpractice”and “tort reform”. One article published more than two years
prior to actual tort reform discusses the need for the California state legislature to
carefully re-examine its laws regarding joint and several liability (Witt 1984).
Pennsylvania reformed its punitive damage caps rules on January 25, 1997 and
adopted no other tort reforms in that decade. Two local newspapers, The Philadelphia Inquirer and The Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, have archives reaching back to January 1, 1994 and March 1, 1993, respectively. We found 84 articles published between January 1, 1994 and January 25, 1997 that mentioned “tort reform”and 6 that
mentioned “punitive damage caps”. One article written about two years prior to
enactment said that “the key goals of the [state] administration... have been to place
a cap on punitive-damage awards”(Siegel 1995).
Pennsylvania also reformed its split recovery rule for punitive damages on March
20, 2002. We searched all articles published in The Philadelphia Inquirer and The
Pittsburgh Post-Gazette between January 1, 1999 and March 20, 2002. We found 627
articles mentioning “punitive damages” and 115 articles mentioning “tort reform”.
One article published more than two years prior to passage of split recovery reform
mentions that a state senator was advocating a bill “that would limit recovery of
punitive damages” (Stark 1999).

A.5

Results for joint and several reform and split recovery

In this section we estimate anticipation effects for two additional tort reforms: joint
and several liability reform split recovery reform. The doctrine of joint and several
53

Data on the circulation size of local newspapers can be obtained from Mondo Newspapers at
http://www.mondonewspapers.com/usa/index.html
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liability allows plaintiffs to recover full damages from a defendant who is only partially
at fault. In the context of medical malpractice, this means a plaintiff can sue her
hospital rather than her doctor for large sums of money even if the hospital bears
little blame for the plaintiff’s injury. Reform of joint and several liability limits this
by either requiring defendants to be responsible for a large fraction of the blame
before have to pay full damages or holding defendants responsible for only their
proportionate share of damages based on their comparative fault for the plaintiff’s
injury. This increases physician liability by holding physicians more accountable for
their actions. Split recovery decreases physician liability by stipulating that the state
receive a portion of any punitive damages awarded to the plaintiff.
Figures 5d and 5e suggest that supply fell prior to joint and several reform (which
increases liability) and rose prior to split recovery reform (which reduces liability).
Furthermore, there does not appear to be a connection between states with low physician supply and states with joint and several reform or between states with high
physician supply and states with split recovery reform. This can be verified in Figure
6, which plots the fraction of states that ever adopt different tort reforms by quartile
of physician supply in 1980.
Appendix A.4 provided evidence that these two reforms were discussed in newspapers prior to their reforms. Figure 12 displays the log of per capita medical malpractice insurance premiums for California during the period 1980-2001. California
enacted reforms to joint and several liability in 1986 and increased the amount of
evidence required to justify punitive damage awards in 1988. These two reforms increase and decrease liability, respectively. The rise in premiums prior to 1986 and
the subsequent decrease provide evidence that insurance companies anticipated these
reforms. Figure 13a plots medical malpractice premiums in the period leading up
to joint and several reform for all 50 states. This plot, which controls for state and
year fixed effects, shows a rise in premiums prior to adoption. This is consistent with
the decrease in physician supply shown in Figure 5d. The analogous plot for split
recovery reform, shown in Figure 13b, displays a decrease in premiums, consistent
with the increase in physician supply shown in Figure 5e.
Appendix Tables 7 – 10 present our estimation results and Appendix Table 11
summarizes them. Our estimates for joint and several reform are significant for almost all models while those for split recovery are significant only for the exponential
discounting model. Table 11 shows that, just as with punitive damage caps, the esA5

Figure 12: Per capita insurance premiums for California
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Note: Premium data are from AM Best. These plots display the direct premiums earned in a given calendar year
divided by the number of physicians in the state in that year for all 50 states. Physician data for 1984 and 1990 are
interpolated. Amounts are in 1984 dollars.

Figure 13: Excess amount of premiums before and after reform: annual leads and lags
from 5 years before to 5 years after adoption
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in the year that a state adopts reform, and γs and γt are state and year fixed effects.
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timated effects increase as we add leads in the quasi-myopic model and are largest
overall for the exponential discounting model.

Appendix tables
Table 7: Myopic and quasi-myopic (QM) estimates for joint and several
Number of leads
Tort reform
Joint and several

(0)

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

-0.028
(0.017)

-0.032*
(0.018)
-0.014*
(0.007)

-0.037*
(0.019)
-0.021**
(0.009)
-0.026**
(0.013)

-0.038*
(0.020)
-0.023**
(0.010)
-0.028*
(0.014)
-0.004
(0.007)

-0.040**
(0.020)
-0.024**
(0.010)
-0.029**
(0.014)
-0.005
(0.008)
-0.004
(0.010)

Myopic
5,473
0.995

QM
5,473
0.995

QM
5,473
0.995

QM
5,473
0.995

QM
5,473
0.995

Lead (t+1)
Lead (t+2)
Lead (t+3)
Lead (t+4)
Model
Observations
R2

Dependent variable is log of count of high-risk physicians per 100,000 population. Reported treatment effects compare within-state changes in adopting versus non-adopting states. Standard errors,
given in parentheses, are clustered by state. A */** next to the coefficient indicates significance at
the 10/5% level.
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Table 8: Myopic and quasi-myopic (QM) estimates for split recovery
Number of leads
Tort reform
Split recovery

(0)

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

0.036
(0.029)

0.036
(0.030)
0.003
(0.013)

0.035
(0.032)
0.002
(0.015)
-0.004
(0.009)

0.036
(0.032)
0.003
(0.015)
-0.004
(0.009)
0.004
(0.008)

0.042
(0.033)
0.008
(0.016)
0.002
(0.009)
0.010
(0.010)
0.024**
(0.009)

Myopic
8,965
0.991

QM
8,965
0.991

QM
8,965
0.991

QM
8,965
0.991

QM
8,965
0.991

Lead (t+1)
Lead (t+2)
Lead (t+3)
Lead (t+4)
Model
Observations
R2

Dependent variable is log of count of high-risk physicians per 100,000 population. Reported treatment effects compare within-state changes in adopting versus non-adopting states. Standard errors,
given in parentheses, are clustered by state. A */** next to the coefficient indicates significance at
the 10/5% level.

Table 9: Exponential discounting model estimates for joint and several
Tort reform
Joint and several (permanent effect)
Joint and several (temporary effect)
b
Discount rate (θ)
Estimation method
IV
Observations
R2
Hansen test (p-value)
AR(3) test (p-value)

(1)

(2)

(3)

-0.036*
(0.021)
-0.013*
(0.007)
0.641**
(0.048)

-0.041*
(0.022)
-0.015*
(0.008)
0.642**
(0.087)

-0.067
(0.044)
-0.013**
(0.006)
0.802**
(0.074)

OLS
None
4,615
0.997

GMM
Leads
3,746

GMM
Lags
4,445

1
0.226

1
0.604

Dependent variable is log of count of high-risk physicians per 100,000 population. Reported treatment effects compare within-state changes in adopting versus non-adopting states. Standard errors,
given in parentheses, are clustered by state. A */** next to the coefficient indicates significance
at the 10/5% level. Permanent effect is defined as the temporary effect divided by one minus the
discount rate. Column (2) instruments for the endogenous variable yist+1 with all available leads of
yist+1 . Column (3) alternatively instruments with all available lags of yist+1 . The AR(3) test checks
for order-3 serial correlation in the residuals.
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Table 10: Exponential discounting model estimates for split recovery
Tort reform
Split recovery (permanent effect)
Split recovery (temporary effect)
b
Discount rate (θ)
Estimation method
IV
Observations
R2
Hansen test (p-value)
AR(3) test (p-value)

(1)

(2)

(3)

0.050*
(0.026)
0.014**
(0.006)
0.723**
(0.051)

0.041*
(0.021)
0.015**
(0.008)
0.622**
(0.098)

0.061*
(0.037)
0.013**
(0.005)
0.791**
(0.076)

OLS
None
7,579
0.995

GMM
Leads
6,216

GMM
Lags
7,119

1
0.993

1
0.982

Dependent variable is log of count of high-risk physicians per 100,000 population. Reported treatment effects compare within-state changes in adopting versus non-adopting states. Standard errors,
given in parentheses, are clustered by state. A */** next to the coefficient indicates significance
at the 10/5% level. Permanent effect is defined as the temporary effect divided by one minus the
discount rate. Column (2) instruments for the endogenous variable yist+1 with all available leads of
yist+1 . Column (3) alternatively instruments with all available lags of yist+1 . The AR(3) test checks
for order-3 serial correlation in the residuals.

Table 11: Summary of estimated permanent effects for joint and several (JS) and split
recovery (SP)
Reform
Model

IV

Myopic
Quasi-myopic (1 lead)
Quasi-myopic (2 leads)
Quasi-myopic (3 leads)
Quasi-myopic (4 leads)
Exponential discounting
Exponential discounting

None
None
None
None
None
Leads
Lags

JS

SP

-0.028
-0.032*
-0.037*
-0.038*
-0.040**
-0.041*
-0.067

0.036
0.036
0.035
0.036
0.042
0.041*
0.061*

Dependent variable is log of count of high-risk physicians per 100,000 population. Reported treatment effects compare within-state changes in adopting versus non-adopting states. A */** next to
the coefficient indicates significance at the 10/5% level. Standard errors are clustered by state.
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